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**BACK TO THE FUTURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL FORCES REVISITED**

BY

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BACK TO THE FUTURE: CONSTABULARY FORCES REVISITED

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ABSTRACT

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United States involvement in peace operations has increased dramatically in the last ten years. It is highly probable that during the next decade, U.S. forces will continue to be involved in crisis intervention missions. If the trend is toward greater involvement in peace operations, should the U.S. design a constabulary force that is specifically organized, equipped, and trained for peace operations? This paper will answer that question by examining the advantages and disadvantages of various proposals. A historical perspective on the U.S. experience with constabulary forces in post-World War II Germany will provide some insights. The paper concludes with some recommendations on how to improve the ability of combat units to execute peace operation missions.

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BACK TO THE FUTURE: CONSTABULARY FORCES REVISTED

"Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it."

—Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold¹

The dangers inherent in the peace operations of the 1990's became a tragic reality for the American military on 3 October, 1993. On that day, U.S. forces and the forces of Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed, engaged in a bloody battle in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia's war-torn capital. When it was over, hundreds of Somalis had lost their lives, and 18 Americans were killed and 75 wounded.² For American political and military leaders, the graphic images of the body of a U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu during Operation Restore Hope serves as a graphic reminder whenever intervention decisions are contemplated. The long term effect of this event has been a debate within political-military circles on the extent of United States participation in peace operations, and the type of force structure the U.S. military needs to conduct these missions.

BACKGROUND

The post-Cold War world has been characterized by ethnic atrocities, failed or failing nation-states, transnational threats, humanitarian crises, and terrorism. In 1999, the National Intelligence Council identified 23 countries undergoing humanitarian crises, and nine others that were likely to develop humanitarian crises. Over the past decade, internal conflicts and civil wars have claimed more than five million lives and spread refugees, disease, and instability on a massive scale.³

In response, the involvement by the international community in peace operations has reached unprecedented levels. Of the 54 peace operations ever launched under UN auspices since 1948, 41 of them (76 percent of the total) were initiated in the last 12 years. These missions have been far from "peaceful." In fact, the increase in missions has also seen a dramatic increase in casualties in peace operations, with 925 peacekeepers from 43 different countries losing their lives during the same period (53 percent of the total).⁴

United States involvement in these operations has also increased dramatically. Policymakers in Washington realize that selective participation in peace operations can serve United States interests, and may be the best way to prevent, resolve, or contain a conflict. As a result, the post-Cold War trend is toward more U.S. involvement in peace operations, including missions of longer duration.⁵

Like it or not, the U.S. military must be prepared to operate in a complex environment where the objectives are often ambiguous and the end state unknown. As a result of the anticipated trend in peace operations, there is a growing chorus of voices within academia and defense circles that are coalescing around a possible solution. It advocates the establishment of units specifically trained and equipped for peace operations (commonly referred to as constabulary forces). The purpose of this paper is to determine if the U.S. military should form constabulary units to meet the challenges of the next decade.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEACE OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

No one knows what the future security environment will look like, but there are characteristics about that environment that many experts believe it will contain. In the phase one report on the emerging global security environment for the first quarter of the 21st Century, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century postulates that interstate wars will occur over the next 25 years, but most violence will erupt from conflicts internal to current states. The number of new states, international protectorates, and zones of autonomy will increase, and many of these will be born in violence.⁶

This point of view of the future security environment and the U.S. military's involvement in it is echoed in a study of American military culture in the 21st Century conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2000. The authors of the study support the position that the U.S. military will be involved in peace operations executed in response to deteriorating economic conditions around the globe, violent independence movements, and the breakdown of many nation-states.⁷

Finally, in an interesting essay on the future global security trends, Sam Tangredi, a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, believes that the trend is toward a "world of warriors" in which youthful populations of less economically developed nations are involved in ethnic, religious, or tribal conflict. In his view of future warfare, international laws of war are rarely observed, and combatants and noncombatants are rarely distinguished. Ethnic cleansing, genocide, famine, torture, and rape will characterize the brutal nature of warfare that American military forces will possibly confront on future peace operations.⁸

OPERATING ACROSS THE SPECTRUM

What are the types of missions that U.S. forces will have to execute in this murky world between peace and war? According to FM 100-23, Peace Operations, there are three types of

peace operation missions: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. In simple terms, support to diplomacy seeks to prevent conflict; peacekeeping attempts to maintain the peace; and peace enforcement attempts to establish peace.⁹

Support to diplomacy includes peace building which seeks to restore civil authority, rebuild physical infrastructures, and reestablish commerce, schools, and medical facilities.¹⁰ Peacekeeping operations are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeeping tasks may include observing, monitoring, and verifying compliance with negotiated truces and cease-fires. They may also include the supervision of demilitarized zones and protected areas; the exchange of prisoners of war; the establishment of refugee camps; and the supervision of elections.¹¹

Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the parties to the conflict, is usually authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and could include combat or armed intervention. Typical missions include the protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.¹²

In the complex environment that U.S. forces are involved in today, it would not be unusual for a single unit to be engaged in each of the different types of peace operations. In fact, the first U.S. ground forces into Kosovo conducted peace building tasks by assisting in the reestablishment of the electric power, water, and telecommunication systems; assisting in the repair and reopening of small businesses and factories; assisting farmers with their harvests by repairing tractors and obtaining equipment; and acquiring or repairing suitable buildings so that the education system could function again.¹³

Peacekeeping operations were also performed by the same unit. Vehicle and foot patrols were conducted throughout the American sector to establish a presence in areas of concern and deter violent acts between Kosovar Albanians and Serbians. Security was provided to isolated Serbian neighborhoods and villages and Albanian refugee camps. Finally, the initial ground forces also conducted peace enforcement missions by enforcing the military technical agreement (MTA) between NATO and Serbia. The terms of the MTA required a phased withdrawal of all Serbian forces in Kosovo. Similarly, NATO signed an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), requiring the turn in of weapons and the demilitarization of the KLA.¹⁴

One final comment about the experiences of the first ground troops into Kosovo is pertinent to this discussion. During the mission, the unit conducted many tasks that were more akin to police-type or constabulary missions. For example, infantry soldiers controlled traffic; searched individuals, vehicles and homes; arrested and detained individuals; and responded to ethnic and domestic crime.¹⁵

A simple definition of the term constabulary would be "a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment."¹⁶ A similar definition of constabulary forces can be found in a military manual written in 1969 entitled, Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict. It states that a constabulary force is formed to "create order in an unstable situation while assisting in and encouraging the development of social organization and public attitudes that are conducive to long-term stability."¹⁷ The bottom line is that peace operations will often involve tasks that run the entire gamut; from the benign to the dangerous, and from the mundane to the politically explosive.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

If one accepts the premise that the United States will continue to be involved in peace operations in the foreseeable future, then the question becomes what is the best approach to meet the anticipated challenges of the next decade. One possible solution is to form constabulary units that are specifically trained to function in the peace operations environment.

Proponents of constabulary forces often cite Morris Janowitz's study conducted in 1960 to support their arguments. Mr. Janowitz (often regarded as the nation's foremost sociologist on military institutions and the social and political consequences of war) wrote in The Professional Soldier that constabulary forces were the future of the military. According to Janowitz, "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture."¹⁸ Mr. Janowitz believed that the nature of the global struggle against the Soviet Union dictated the use of minimum force to prevent a future conflict from getting out of control. This commitment to minimum force was more akin to constabulary forces and not combat forces.

Janowitz's monumental study, however, is outdated. He wrote during a period when nuclear annihilation between the two superpowers was believed to be a real possibility. He argued that "atomic" weapons had so altered the use of force in international relations that it was more appropriate to speak of constabulary forces rather than military forces. In other words, military force would only be used to prevent, contain, or limit conflict, and those tasks

were more akin to police or constabulary duty.¹⁹ Limited war and military operations other than war were not concepts that were recognized or understood. No one in 1960 could have envisioned the collapse of the Soviet Union or the complex nature of military conflict in the last decade.

A more recent study that advocates constabulary forces is the previously mentioned U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. Last year, it released a report criticizing the Pentagon's "two Major Theater War" strategy. Specifically, the panel claimed that the present method of sizing forces will no longer be viable in the coming decades. It postulated that peace operations were likely to increase, and therefore, necessitated the creation of forces different from those designed for major theater war. The United States, it concluded, needed rapidly employable expeditionary forces with humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities.²⁰

Thomas Donnelly, deputy executive director of the Project for the New American Century (a conservative Washington think tank) would agree. He is a strong advocate for the formation of constabulary forces to enforce a new "*Pax Americana*".²¹ Donnelly argues that the sooner the U.S. government recognizes that it is managing a new empire, the sooner it can take steps to reshape the military to fit that mission. In his view of the world, maintaining American power globally is already the unspoken basis of U.S. strategy, and constabulary forces will enable America to maintain that power.

Unlike the aforementioned advocates, Don Snider, a retired Army Colonel and Professor at the United States Military Academy, goes one step further and proposes a possible force structure for constabulary forces. He argues for a constabulary force of approximately 15,000 personnel. The Army Constabulary Force or ACF would be roughly equivalent to three military police (MP) brigades. According to Snider, "The ACF would replace current Army divisional forces in such missions, except in the initial stages or during re-escalation of conflict when more coercive military force might be needed."²²

The strength of COL Snider's argument is that it recognizes the special skills required in peace operations, and the degradation in warfighting capability that these missions have on units. By assigning peace operation missions to a special organization, it will enable the remainder of the military to focus on fighting the nation's wars.

Another option has been proposed by Philip Kronenberg, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Indiana. His position is that the National Guard should be reorganized into two distinct components with two different missions. Part of the National Guard would be organized into units designated as the national reserve supporting the active duty military during

times of conflict. The remainder of the National Guard would be organized into a “peacefare force” that is trained as police and disaster relief units.²³ He believes that the Guard’s strong orientation towards combat inhibits its ability to perform police functions during disturbances. In his opinion, “Standards of police personnel selection, training, discipline, communications, and operating rules are quite different from the Army’s.”²⁴ Therefore, a peacefare force would provide the military with an enhanced capability to perform police-type missions.

Although the same argument is often used in the current debate as a justification for establishing constabulary units specifically trained for peace operations, Kronenberg was not arguing for a force to be used external to the United States. In fact, although his article was written 25 years ago, it would be more appropriate to the current debate of how the military might reorganize to respond to the Homeland Security mission in response to terrorism. Nonetheless, it is included in this paper because a reorganization of some units currently located in the National Guard and Reserves, especially low density, high demand (LDHD) units, might be applicable as we examine a feasible recommendation presented later in this paper.

The most recent proposal for a constabulary force was presented in Military Review last year. In that article, COL Timothy Cherry proposed an engagement force (EFOR) as a solution to the anticipated increase in peace operations. EFOR would be a corps-size force designed and focused solely on peace operations. It would devote its full attention to preparing subordinate units for peace operations, and it would establish a school focused on peace operation missions and tasks. EFOR would be subordinate to Forces Command, and when committed, attached to a regional commander-in-chief (CINC). The force would consist of two infantry divisions, each with three infantry brigades, an MP brigade, engineer brigade, aviation brigade, division support command, tank battalion, signal battalion, military intelligence battalion, civil affairs company, and PSYOP company. The divisions would not require organic division artillery, division cavalry squadron, or an air defense battalion.²⁵

The advantages of this proposal are that with six brigade task forces, EFOR could sustain one or two peace operations indefinitely, or three or more missions for shorter duration. EFOR units would be experts in peace operations and prepared to respond to any short notice contingency in support of national security interests. The rest of the military could concentrate on key engagement and warfighting requirements. Additionally, all EFOR units, including the combat support and combat service support units, would be a part of the active force structure. The EFOR proposal is very similar in its recommended training, organization, and capability to the U.S. Army Constabulary force created after World War II.

LOOKING BACK

The idea of establishing constabulary units is not new and before examining the arguments against the formation of constabulary forces, it is instructive to examine the only time the U.S. military reorganized itself into a special constabulary force. When World War II ended in 1945, there were approximately three million American troops in Europe. By the end of that year, two and a half million had been shipped home. As a result of the rapid redeployment, unit cohesion, morale and discipline began to breakdown, and there were not enough troops to occupy some of the large towns. Most of the German citizens living in the countryside rarely saw an occupation soldier. Military planners decided that a new mobile force would have to be created to move about constantly to increase the presence of American troops throughout its zone of responsibility. As a result, in late October 1945, General Eisenhower announced that the U.S. Zone of Germany would be controlled by a super police force or constabulary.²⁶

The 38,000 member constabulary was organized and equipped as an elite force. It was organized into three brigades of three regiments each, equipped with light tanks, half-tracks, armored cars, motorcycles, jeeps, and horses for patrolling difficult terrain along the border. A U.S. Constabulary school was established in southern Bavaria to provide soldiers with special training in their police duties. Their instruction included the history of Germany, occupational policy, courts and laws, police procedures, patrolling, and search and seizure operations.²⁷

Upon completion of the special training, soldiers in the unit were given the power to arrest, detain, hold, and transport people.²⁸ (It is interesting to note that almost 50 years later, units receive similar training before deploying to Bosnia or Kosovo. Training includes instruction on the history of the country, legal issues, rules of engagement, police procedures, mounted and dismounted patrolling, and cordon and search operations).

The elite force was also given a unique uniform. Russell Hill of the *New York Herald Tribune* provided the following description of the Constabulary soldier in 1946:

"The trooper was dressed up in a flashy uniform — blue and gold striped helmet liner, Sam Browne belt, golden neckerchief of parachute silk, and paratrooper boots. He carried a Colt automatic, a carbine or a Tommy gun. On his shoulder was the conspicuous patch of the Constabulary — a blue "C" on a golden yellow background with a superimposed red thunderbolt."²⁹

To command the Constabulary, the Army chose one of its best tank commanders of World War II, Major General Ernest N. Harmon. Harmon had a reputation for being able to turn poorly performing divisions into combat efficient units. He has been described as a tough disciplinarian, profane, bombastic, and roared like a bull. The troops loved him.³⁰ The mobile organization, special training, unique uniform, and high standards of its first commander

succeeded in creating a disciplined and trained soldier that impressed the German population and American allies.

What is often lost in the debate to create constabulary forces is that the Constabulary units were eventually reorganized back into tactical units beginning in 1948 to increase their tactical performance. U.S. Army Europe was determined to rebuild a tactical force because the threat from internal disorder was deemed less than the threat of Soviet aggression. A training program was directed that included limited objective attack, hasty defense, delaying action, obstacles, and demolitions. By December of 1948, the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Constabulary Regiments were converted into the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs).³¹

The great U.S. Army experiment with constabulary forces was effectively coming to an end. The reorganization did not end the responsibility for the constabulary missions. Some of the missions were assumed by German police units. Other missions were assumed by the ACRs. The necessity to have units capable of fighting and winning against potential future aggression dictated converting the U.S. Constabulary back into conventional tactical units.³²

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

On the surface, the positions presented by Don Snider for the establishment of the Army Constabulary Force (ACF) and Tim Cherry for the establishment of an Engagement Force (EFOR) appear logical and do address some of the current problems encountered by American forces conducting peace operations.

The problem with Don Snider's position is that it fails to recognize that "re-escalation" can occur in the blink of an eye or the speed of a bullet. In a complex peace operations environment, it is conceivable that humanitarian peace support operations, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement or combat operations could all occur simultaneously in different locations in the same sector. The problems encountered by United Nations peacekeepers in Somalia are a good example of this situation.

In the summer prior to the tragedy involving the Army Rangers, peacekeeping troops from numerous countries were helping international organizations deliver humanitarian aid in one section of Mogadishu; other soldiers were involved in inspecting weapon storage sites in another part of the city; and combat operations (including the use of 11 TOW antitank missiles) were being conducted in yet another part of the city.³³

Furthermore, COL Snider believes that once the ACF is completely committed, the nation's political leaders could justify to the American public and the international community U.S. refusal to become involved in additional peace operations. This position is not realistic.

There are many factors that go into a decision to intervene such as the political climate of the nation at the time; the focus of the media and public; the scale of the crises; the involvement of Congress; and the advice being given to the President, to name just a few. At the end of the day, national interests and the interests of our elected officials, not the size of the ACF, will determine when and where military forces are committed.

The EFOR concept proposed by Tim Cherry also has a couple of significant problems. A course of action is not considered valid unless it is considered feasible, acceptable, and suitable.³⁴ A feasible course of action must answer the question, "Do we have the required resources?" The short answer to the EFOR proposal is "no." COL Cherry believes that the EFOR would require at least 40,000 personnel to field the corps headquarters, school cadre and two divisions. His solution incorporates a combination of new and existing units: one division would be added to the force structure (for a total of 11), and one division would be converted to an EFOR division.³⁵ The EFOR concept proposed by Tim Cherry could be considered feasible if the military dramatically increased the size of its force structure.³⁶

For arguments sake, let us assume that the military is able to increase the size of its force. Is the Cherry proposal acceptable? Specifically, is it politically supportable? Given the current policy environment in Washington, once again, the answer is "no." The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report released in September 2001 articulated a new force-sizing construct designed to accomplish four goals: defend the United States; deter aggression; defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts; and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations (SSCs).³⁷ The Bush Administration has concluded that in order to accomplish the four goals in the QDR, the United States needed a force of ten divisions. Therefore, the likelihood of adding another division, and/or setting aside one of the active divisions for EFOR would not be acceptable to the current Administration.

Once again, let us assume that the EFOR proposal is acceptable to the current Administration or some future administration. Without being constrained by size or funding, is the EFOR concept suitable? Will it get the job done? Or to put the question in simple terms: Is the EFOR concept good policy? The answer is still "no." FM 100-23, Peace Operations, postulates that a force tailored for peacekeeping operations may lack sufficient combat power for peace enforcement operations. On the other hand, a force tailored for peace enforcement operations can accomplish peacekeeping missions.³⁸ In other words, a force designed specifically for peace operations may not be able to accomplish the mission.

BG John S. Brown, the Army's Chief of Military History, would agree with this position. He believes that each constabulary-like mission is unique. What works in one mission may not

work in the next. If the Army attempted to design a specific force for peace operations, it would pick the wrong Table of Organization and Equipment for the next crisis.³⁹ It is important, therefore, not to develop a new organization, but to choose an appropriate task organization to do the job. Regardless of how well trained the soldiers are for peace operations, the mission will encounter difficulty if it does not have the right task organization to execute the mission.

According to Brigadier General Raymond Bell, selecting the proper task organization, not creating a special unit, is the right answer. In his opinion, the root cause of the dilemma U.S. forces encountered in Somalia was an improper force structure to conduct peace enforcement operations. Instead of a constabulary force to conduct these missions, he proposes the establishment of a permanent Task Force headquarters, commanded by a three-star general that would focus on peace operations. The staff would have a nucleus of active-duty personnel, but would be heavily augmented by qualified reservists.

Ideally, this headquarters would have a staff that is experienced in peace operations and could quickly identify the type of units needed for the mission; oversee the training of the apportioned forces; and command the organization(s) upon deployment. A typical task organization would probably include infantry, light armor units, military police, intelligence assets, aviation, engineers, signal, combat support units, combat service support units, Special Forces units, and civil affairs units.⁴⁰ Every peace operation is different, and therefore, the force that is sent into that environment must be tailored to the situation on the ground and adjusted as the mission changes.

OLD BOX, NEW WRAPPING

The establishment of constabulary forces might seem to be “thinking out of the box,” but as it has been illustrated, it is really “old thinking in an old box with new wrapping.” In general, there are three major problems associated with the formation of constabulary forces: First, the strategy mismatch between ends and means; second, the potential for intense violence during peace operations; and third, the degraded warfighting capability of units involved in peace operations.

Senior military leaders are reluctant to get involved in peace operations. For them, the issue is not a question of policy that might change with the next administration. It is a question of mission, capability, and adequate resources. At the strategic level, the military argues that the primary mission of the armed forces must be to fight and win our nation’s wars. It is the fundamental reason for having a military. Any mission that degrades the military’s ability to decisively defeat potential enemies cannot be good for the military, and thus, not good for the

country. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed this concern in a speech he delivered at the National Defense University on January 31, 2002. He told his audience that even as we prosecute the war on terrorism, prepare for the next war, and transform the military to meet the challenges of this new century, the mission of the Armed Forces remains "fixed, determined, inviolable – it is to win our wars."⁴¹ The current Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Eric Shinseki, would agree. From his perspective, the Army must always be ready to fulfill its "non-negotiable contract with the American people – to provide land force dominance in fighting and winning the Nation's wars – decisively."⁴²

Furthermore, the military argues that it does not have enough resources (money or personnel) to achieve the strategic goal of fighting two overlapping major conflicts and conduct multiple peace operations. Military leaders believe peace operations consume valuable resources that the military cannot afford during this era of tight budgets; degrade its warfighting capability; and jeopardize its ability to fulfill its primary mission. Unless the military's resources are dramatically increased, the formation of constabulary units must be taken out of the current force structure. The crucial question is this: Can an Army with ten divisions afford to have one or two divisions focused solely on peace operations? If more than two divisions are needed for additional missions, do we convert more divisions to handle the tasks? Conversely, if a major theater war requires more than eight divisions, do we attempt to convert the constabulary units back into a traditional warfighting divisions?

Military leaders believe that forces designed specifically for peace operations on the low end of the operational continuum would create higher risks to the national security if a conflict occurred on the high end of the continuum. To solve this problem, the Army intends to build a force that can operate effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict. According to General Shinseki, the whole purpose of the Objective Force is to build a force that is optimized for major theater war, but is sufficiently versatile and agile to handle the smaller scale contingencies (e.g. peace operations) that will occur more often. He envisions units in the Objective Force to be able to conduct warfighting and stability operations, transitioning smoothly from one category of operation to the other and back again without any loss of momentum or operational focus.⁴³

The second reason for not supporting the formation of constabulary units is that peace enforcement operations can rapidly escalate into intense firefights, mortar attacks, and ambushes. Again, history is instructive in the potentially violent nature of these missions. In 1995, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was entangled in a messy peace operation in Bosnia. The UN force was successful at delivering food and supplies to the affected populations, but it was a failure at protecting the designated safe areas. In the summer

of 1995, Bosnian Serb forces declared all UN Security Council resolutions null and void and resumed their offensives. Peacekeepers were injured and dozens taken hostage. In July, the Bosnian Serb forces attacked the protected area of Srebrenica, brushing aside the Dutch battalion protecting the city. The peacekeepers were lightly armed and their rules of engagement were to only fire in self-defense. They stood by and watched helplessly as the population was bundled out of town. Later it was learned that hundreds, and possibly thousands, were executed.⁴⁴

A more recent example occurred in Sierra Leone. After a decade of civil war and an estimated 150,000 deaths, the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace deal. The RUF agreed to surrender their weapons in exchange for Cabinet seats in a government of national unity and control of the country's diamond mines. In July 2000, the RUF reneged on the agreement, attacked UN outposts and convoys, and took approximately 300 UN peacekeepers as hostages. In the words of Fred Eckhard, a UN spokesman: "The RUF was supposed to turn in its guns. Instead, it turned its guns on us."⁴⁵

One of the recurring themes highlighted during a Kosovo Conference conducted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute at the U.S. Army War College last year was that peacekeeping is not warfighting, but it can come real close. The report states that peace operations may involve operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, and therefore, combat units are still the best option for peace operations.⁴⁶ GEN John Hendrix, former Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command strongly supports this position. He states, "We've seen in places like Somalia how the level of threat can rapidly escalate into intense combat, and for that reason, I think it would be difficult to take the peacekeeping mission away from trained combat troops."⁴⁷

Finally, the warfighting capability of units is degraded during the conduct of peace operations. This limitation of a Constabulary force was recognized back in 1946. A review of historical documents from the European Command revealed the following statement:

"We recognize and the War Department recognizes that we have no tactical capabilities; and the training of battalions, regiments, etc., for tactical work is over and that the only training we can do will be individual training, very small group training, and most of that will be on-the-job."⁴⁸

In fact, the combat efficiency of the U.S. Constabulary in 1946 was estimated at 65 percent. The Constabulary soldier was disciplined and trained in individual skills, but unit collective training was non-existent. As a result of a further reduction of personnel in Europe in 1947, the Constabulary lost its light tank elements and estimated combat efficiency dropped to 50 percent.⁴⁹

Surveys conducted at the U.S. Army War College in 1997 and 1998 re-validate the old findings. In those surveys, students with experience in peace operations were asked about the impact of those missions on their combat readiness. For both of the surveyed years, the majority of students were of the opinion that peace operations degraded their unit's ability to conduct combat operations. Interestingly, the majority in both groups concluded that individual and platoon-level skills were enhanced by the mission, and that significant degradation in warfighting skills occurred at the company and battalion level.⁵⁰

RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB

In spite of the military's distaste for peace operations, all of the services are slowly evolving from a forward deployed force into an expeditionary force capable of rapidly responding to smaller crises. The Navy is transitioning from a "blue-water" force to a "brown-water" force, focused on projecting power along the populated coastlines around the world. The Marine Corps has shifted its focus from amphibious assaults to "full spectrum" operations. The Air Force has reorganized into Air Expeditionary Forces, and the Army is in the process of "transforming" into a lighter, faster, and more lethal organization.⁵¹

The realities of the post-Cold War security environment have caused all of the military services to reexamine how their forces are organized, equipped, and trained to meet the new challenges. In the words of GEN Henry Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "It is naïve to think that the military will become involved in only those areas that affect our vital national interests. The strategic environment will most certainly cause us to deploy forces to achieve limited military objectives."⁵² The establishment of constabulary units is not the answer to the changing security environment. The volatile nature of peace operations and the force requirements for Major Theater War argue against the creation of units with a limited, special role. The right tools for the job are properly trained combat soldiers.

A BETTER MOUSETRAP

Combat units should continue to be used for peace operations, but the Department of Defense needs to improve the education and training of all soldiers for participation in these missions. Training for peace operations must begin in the military education system. To better prepare units for a complex future environment, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) needs to update current doctrine; publish techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) unique to the peace operations environment; incorporate peace operations subjects (civil-military relations, negotiations, crowd control, etc.) into the curriculum of the military education system;

and add peace operations tasks to unit mission essential task lists (METL) at a specified period before deployment.

A similar conclusion was reached at a conference hosted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute last year. Its recommendations included the development of a TTP manual for peace operations; the development of tasks, conditions, and standards (TCS) for stability and support operations; and incorporating peace operations instruction into all leader education within the TRADOC system.⁵³

Even in 1960, Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier, recognized that professional soldiers must develop skills that are more common to civilian administrators. He writes, "Under the constabulary concept, even the most junior officer, depending on his assignment, may be acting as a political agent. Political-military education cannot be delayed until the middle of the officer's career, when he enters the war college."⁵⁴

In recent peace operations, junior leaders are negotiating with local officials, hosting town meetings, coordinating with UN representatives, supporting interagency officials, and assisting non-governmental organizations. If these are the typical tasks that young leaders are performing today in peace operations, it is incumbent upon the military education system to expose junior leaders (officers and noncommissioned officers) earlier in their career to the unique requirements of this environment.

The biggest challenge facing combat units conducting peace operations is trying to maintain their warfighting ability. In fact, this has always been the challenge for combat forces on constabulary-type missions. A study conducted by the Office of Naval Research in 1969 examined five constabulary missions conducted over a period of 70 years (1901-1970) in the Philippines, American Samoa, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. In all five cases, the degradation of the warfighting capability of the committed combat units was cited as a problem. The 1969 study stated:

"The performance of constabulary functions by general purpose forces necessarily involves either a considerable revamping of the regular forces, with damaging effects on their conventional warfare capabilities, or the under-utilization of their manpower and weaponry on missions requiring capabilities in addition to those required of main force units."⁵⁵

To change this dynamic, it is important for combat units to change their unit mission essential task list (METL) to incorporate peace operations at least 90 days before deployment, and sustain training on the revised METL during deployment. The exact amount of training time required is dependent upon the type of unit, its state of readiness, and the nature of the peace operation mission.

This point, including the tasks on the unit METL is contrary to current Army doctrine. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, specifically states that peace operations “are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit’s mission essential task list (METL).”⁵⁶ However, considering the number of critical tasks that must be conducted that are not normally included in a unit’s METL, the Army should reconsider its position.

In the previously mentioned War College survey that was conducted in 1998, fifty critical peace operation tasks were identified that were not included in unit METLs prior to deployment.⁵⁷ More importantly, the majority of students responded that they were willing to neglect some of their warfighting METL tasks to incorporate peace operation tasks.⁵⁸ Fifty critical tasks should send a clear signal to the Army doctrine writers that maybe peace operations are significantly different and that it should be included in unit METLs.

It is also important for combat units to develop an aggressive plan to train on their revised METL while assigned to peace operations. After learning some valuable lessons from a decade of peace operations, the U.S. military quickly established training facilities in Kosovo to maintain individual and unit combat skills. During the six-month deployment, soldiers are able to maintain their weapons proficiency, train for combat in the cities, call for fire, coordinate the employment of attack aviation, and conduct maneuver live-fires at the squad and platoon level. It is not possible to conduct collective training at the company and battalion level because of the manpower required for the daily missions. Nonetheless, the more time a unit spends maintaining its tactical proficiency during peace operations, the less time it will spend re-training upon redeployment to be ready for a warfighting mission.

Finally, regardless of the type of unit selected to conduct peace operations, the U.S. military needs to change the distribution of units within the active component and the Reserve component. The Reserve component contains 97 percent of the Army’s civil affairs units; 82 percent of its public affairs units; 81 percent of its psychological operations forces; 66 percent of military police forces; and 85 percent of the medical brigades. The increase in peace operations has dramatically increased the requirement to activate and deploy Reserve component units. Reserve officials are concerned that reservists and their employers may be approaching the saturation point in terms of tolerance for being away from their homes and jobs.⁵⁹ As a possible solution, the military should consider increasing the number of low density, high demand (LDHD) units in the active structure without increasing the overall end strength.

CONCLUSION

Combat units are the most adaptable units to deploy into the uncertain environment of peace operations. Properly educated, trained, and equipped soldiers will get the job done. Constabulary forces are an option, but the risks on the higher end of the spectrum of conflict, and the dangerous nature of the mission, would argue against the formation of special units. Robert Killebrew, a defense consultant and retired Army Colonel, summarized it best when he wrote in *Armed Forces Journal*,

"It is not specially designed, weaker forces that provide the muscle to enforce peace; it is tough, combat forces, superior to local militias, that compel respect and deter adventurism in the streets and alleys of Bosnia and elsewhere. They provide deterrence with a vengeance – exactly where it's needed."⁶⁰

In spite of the shortcomings, at the tactical level, soldiers at all levels have risen to meet the challenges of this "new world disorder." For example, during a single six-month deployment last year, 2200 Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) landed in Macedonia to provide security for Kosovar Albanian refugees fleeing the atrocities in Kosovo; participated in the Kosovo air campaign with their Harrier jets; and were some of the first U.S. forces to enter Kosovo to secure the American sector. On their way home, the unit was diverted to Turkey to provide humanitarian relief after a devastating earthquake hit that country.⁶¹

In a world of uncertain futures and uncertain threats, the United States needs forces like the Marine Corps' 26th MEU and the Army's tactical combat units. Constabulary forces are not the answer. America needs units that can operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. Versatile units and leaders, educated, trained, and equipped for a variety of environments will provide the best insurance for America.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 1.

² Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 20.

³ James Kitfield, "Lessons from Kosovo," National Journal 32 (December 2000): 3938.

⁴ United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Some Questions and Answers," 28 February 2002; available from <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ques.htm>>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2002.

⁵ John J. Spinelli, "Peacetime Operations: Reducing Friction," in QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security, ed. Michele A. Flournoy (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 268.

⁶ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, "New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century," 15 September 1999; available from <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-futr.htm>>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2002.

⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century (Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2000), 52.

⁸ Sam J. Tangredi, "The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a Consensus View," in QDR 2001 Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security, ed. Michele A. Flournoy (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 46.

⁹ FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 2.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 4-5.

¹² Ibid., 6-11.

¹³ Joseph Anderson, "Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness for Peacekeeping Operations," Military Review 81(September-October 2001): 42.

¹⁴ Ibid., 36-37.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Colleen L. McGuire, Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2001), 2.

¹⁷ Dean Havron et al., Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Research, 1969), 2.

¹⁸ Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 418.

¹⁹ Ibid., 419.

²⁰ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, "Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change," 15 February 2001; available from <<http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2002.

²¹ Thomas E. Ricks, "Empire or Not? A Quiet Debate Over U.S. Role," Washington Post, 21 August, 2001 [database on-line]; available from UMI ProQuest, Bell & Howell; accessed 29 December 2001.

²² Don M. Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force," Army 48 (June 1998): 14.

²³ Roger A. Beaumont and Martin Edmonds, eds., War in the Next Decade (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 125-127.

²⁴ Ibid., 120.

²⁵ Timothy D. Cherry, "Engagement Force: A Solution to the Readiness Dilemma," Military Review 81 (September-October 2001): 108.

²⁶ Russell Hill, Struggle for Germany (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 141.

²⁷ Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953 (Darmstadt, Germany: United States Army Europe Historical Division, Europe, 1953), 66.

²⁸ Robert F. Dorr, "Constabulary Troops Were 'Combat Cops' in Germany," Army Times, 3 September 2001, p.31.

²⁹ Hill, 142.

³⁰ Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Come as a Conqueror (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 167.

³¹ Department of the Army, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, Reorganization of Tactical Forces VE-Day to 1 January 1949 (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division, Europe, 1950), 40-44.

³² The United States occupation of Japan faced similar challenges to the occupation of Germany. The size of the occupation force dropped sharply every month. Units were deactivated, and troops were sent home. A significant difference, however, is that the occupation forces in Japan did not reorganize into a special constabulary force. The areas of responsibility were assigned to the tactical brigades and divisions that existed in the theater at the end of the war. Areas of responsibility were expanded as tactical units were deactivated or redeployed to the United States. Department of the Army, Chronology of the Occupation (Tokyo, Japan: Historical Division, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, 1946), 1-6.

³³ William J. Dutsch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State-Building' in Somalia," in UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Dutsch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 346.

³⁴ Joint Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1 (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, 2000), 4-42.

³⁵ Cherry, 108.

³⁶ Increasing the size of the military is just one of the resource challenges. Another issue is the funding for peace operations. The costs to the Department of Defense (DoD) of carrying out peace operations have risen dramatically in the past decade. DoD must rely on supplemental appropriations from Congress to pay for peace operations. The appropriations usually arrive late in the fiscal year. In the meantime, DoD must pay the costs from its operation and maintenance account. Therefore, diverting funds for peace operations can harm the military's readiness for conventional war. Congressional Budget Office, "Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations," December 1999; available from <<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1809&sequence=1>>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2002.

³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 17.

³⁸ FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 12.

³⁹ John S. Brown, "Combat Cops? The Army as Constabulary: Lessons From Our Past," Armed Forces Journal International 138 (September 2000): 68.

⁴⁰ Raymond E. Bell, Jr., "Somalia Revisited," Armed Forces Journal International 134 (March 1997): 42-43.

⁴¹ Donald Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on 21st Century Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces;" 31 January 2002; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2002.

⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 1.

⁴³ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁴ Dutsch, 244-254.

⁴⁵ Johanna McGahey, William Dowell, and Douglas Waller, "When the Peace Cannot Be Kept," Time, 22 May 2000, 54.

⁴⁶ U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Kosovo After Action Review (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), xii.

⁴⁷ James Kitfield, "Peacekeeper's Progress," National Journal 32 (December 2000): 3952.

⁴⁸ "Reorganization of Tactical Forces V-E Day to 1 January 1949," 16.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 28.

⁵⁰ Michael J. Walsh, Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Combat Readiness, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 22 April 1998), 13-15.

⁵¹ Kitfield, "Peacekeeper's Progress," 3949-3950.

⁵² Ibid., 3948.

⁵³ U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, 17-20. According to LTC Brent Bankus of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, all of the services are currently working together to produce a TTP manual. The manual, FM 3-07.1, Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Peace Operations, is expected to be a multi-service publication focused at the brigade level and below. A draft of the manual will be published in April 2002, with the final version of the manual published for distribution in February 2003.

⁵⁴ Janowitz, 426.

⁵⁵ Havron, iv.

⁵⁶ FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 86. The new doctrinal publication being produced by the Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, is consistent with this position. On page 2-20 of the draft, it states: "In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions. The combat tasks, tactics, techniques, and procedures used in offensive and defensive operations are the same as those employed in stability operations."

⁵⁷ Walsh, C-1.

⁵⁸ Walsh, 24.

⁵⁹ Kitfield, "Peacekeeper's Progress," 3951.

⁶⁰ Robert B. Killebrew, "Deterrence with a Vengeance," Armed Forces Journal International 136 (October 1998): 76.

⁶¹ James Kitfield, "The Peacekeepers," Government Executive (March 2001): 46.

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